

Logic of *Long*: How to understand the continuities and changes in Chinese foreign policies

Lógica de *Long*: cómo entender las continuidades y los cambios en las políticas exteriores chinas

龙的逻辑：如何理解中国外交政策的沿革

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Abstract:

Chinese foreign policies are usually investigated based on the conception that China is a socialist and rising power. The tradition factors are thus overlooked or even distorted. In fact, the foreign policies of socialist China has been shaped and influenced by the traditional factors such as history and culture. National revival as the total international goal is rooted deeply in Chinese double memories of great civilization and humiliation century. Its policy approaches have been influenced the strategic culture of Wangdao. The combination of traditional factors and contemporary conditions such as personal, national and international factors has shaped together the foreign policies of socialist China since 1949. Based on this logic, there have been the astonishing continuities in China's foreign policies from Chairman Mao to President Xi while some changes happened in the level of policy approach.

Key words: long. Chinese foreign policies.

Resumen:

Las políticas exteriores chinas generalmente se investigan en base a la concepción de que China es una potencia socialista y en ascenso. Los factores de la tradición se pasan por alto o incluso se distorsionan. De hecho, la política exterior de la China socialista ha sido moldeada e influenciada por factores tradicionales como la historia y la cultura. El rejuvenecimiento nacional como el objetivo internacional total

está profundamente arraigado en el doble recuerdo chino del siglo de la gran civilización y de la humillación. Sus enfoques políticos han sido influenciados por la cultura estratégica de Wangdao. La combinación de factores tradicionales y condiciones contemporáneas como factores personales, nacionales e internacionales han dado forma a las políticas exteriores de la China socialista desde 1949. Según esta lógica, ha habido continuidades asombrosas en las políticas exteriores de China desde el presidente Mao hasta el presidente Xi, mientras que se produjeron algunos cambios en el nivel del enfoque político.

Palabras clave: largo. Políticas exteriores chinas.

摘要:

有关中国外交政策的研究主要基于中国是一个社会主义国家和新兴国家的认知范畴。人们进行外交政策研究时往往忽略甚至曲解了中国传统的因素。实际上，历史、文化等传统因素也影响、塑造了中国的外交政策。以中华民族伟大复兴为使命的外交政策深深根植于一种双重记忆：对中国作为伟大文明的记忆与对百年屈辱的记忆。中国的外交政策重心受到了“王道”战略文化的影响。传统元素与个人、国家、国际等当代条件相结合，共同塑造了1949年后社会主义中国的外交政策。基于这种逻辑，我们可以看到由毛泽东主席到习近平主席任职期间，外交政策的连续性，同时我们也可以发现，外交政策的重心也随着时代有所调整。

INTRODUCTION

Since President Xi Jinping took office, many policy analysts have claimed that the foreign policies of People's Republic of China (PRC) have become more assertive and tougher. They believe that China is becoming a revisionist power, which intends to bully its neighbors and replace the position of the US as a world hegemon.¹ But, these assertions are oversimplified and just the mirror of misunderstandings to Chinese foreign policies. The real image of China's foreign policy is more comprehensive and complicated. Fundamentally, the misunderstanding and distortion about the foreign policies of China is originated from the simplistic and even erroneous images about the history, culture and reality of China. For example, *long* (龙, lóng), the symbol of Chinese civilization and tradition, has been mistranslated into *dragon* in the English world. But, *long* and *dragon* is totally different creatures. Although there are some common features for both: huge body, fire-breathing, scaly skin and horned head, their differences are too evident: *dragon* is black and sturdy, has two wings and usually lives the underground lair, and *long* has a longer body, no wings and its skin is usually golden. More importantly, two creatures have the different meaning in their cultural backgrounds. *Dragon* is usually the symbol of evil in Western culture, but *long* represents power, luckiness and the supreme status in Chinese tradition. Here, the misconception of *long* is a metaphor of the misunderstanding of Chinese foreign policies. China is usually analyzed as a socialist power (socialism is a western conception too) and few attention is paid to its tradition especially its complicated history and profound culture. But, to achieve a real and comprehensive understanding about the logic of China's foreign policy including the diplomacy under President Xi Jinping, it is necessary to investigate how the ancient tradition influences the foreign policies of a socialist country in contemporary conditions.

¹ Dylan Loh Ming Hui, "Back against the wall no more: How ASEAN can stand up to China in the South China Sea disputes", Aug 7, 2013, <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2013/08/07/back-against-the-wall-no-more-how-asean-can-stand-up-to-china-in-the-south-china-sea-disputes/>.

INFLUENCE OF THE TRADITION ON MODERN CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICIES

In the most analysis framework of Chinese foreign policy, China has been defined as a rising socialist power competing with the US, a capitalist hegemon or established power. Because that the factors of tradition have been deleted intentionally or unintentionally from the analysis of Chinese foreign policies, it is inevitable to oversimplify and even distort the conception and nature of Chinese foreign policies and behaviors. Thus, the tradition factors must be added back to the analysis of Chinese foreign policies.

Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, the founders of socialist China, were influenced greatly by the Chinese tradition. As a believer in Marxism, Chairman Mao was at the same time the fanatical fans of Chinese traditional classics, especially history works. It is well-known that Chairman Mao read carefully the *Twenty-four Histories* and made a great deal of notes. In fact, he had drawn a lot of wisdom and statecrafts from these classics in the running China. Premier Zhou, as the first premier and foreign minister (1949-1958) of PRC, was the chief representative and the CEO of new China in the world stage because of Chairman Mao had less interest in the foreign visits. Actually, the diplomatic rules, norms and style of socialist China was mainly created by Premier Zhou and continued to today. Premier Zhou is respected and loved by his followers because of his elegant leadership inherited the Confucian tradition. During the Cultural Revolution, his opponents attacked him on the same base and tagged him as "the contemporary Zhou Gong" (Zhou Gong was an ancient politician who was considered the sage in Confucianism but the reactionary politician in the extreme Chinese leftists then). It is not surprisingly that Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou created a socialist diplomacy, but based on the Chinese traditions. Since 1949, the factors of tradition, mainly history and culture, have been the prominent variables to shape the goals and tools of Chinese foreign policies.

INFLUENCE OF HISTORIC FACTORS

As a nation with a long history, the Chinese conception of the external world is deeply influenced by its memory about history. In the modern history, China had suffered the invasion and humiliation lasting for almost one hundred year from the Western powers and Japan. The unethical opium war which aimed at punishing China for its blocking the opium trade opened the gate of a century of humiliation. From 1840s to 1940s, China was forced to conclude numerous unequal treaties. According to these treaties, nearly 2 million sq.km Chinese territories were ceded to foreign countries (mainly Russia and Japan), and China was forced to pay the huge indemnities which deepened its poverty and hindered its modernization. Besides that, the then China lost its autonomy on the key policy fields such as customs, trade, immigration, justice and foreign policies and thus was in fact reduced into a Semi-colony. After suffering so much in the modern history, a sense of humiliation has rooted in the historical memory of Chinese people. Even in the current foreign relations, if the Western powers treat China unfairly, this unpleasant memory would be likely recalled back in the mind of Chinese leaders and people. As Deng Xiaoping told his guest in 1989 that when he heard that the seven Western countries, at their summit meeting, had decided to impose sanctions on China, his immediate was to 1900, when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China.²

² 《邓小平文选》（第三卷），人民出版社2001年版，第359页。

Besides the side of darkness and humiliation, there is another glorious side of the Chinese historical memory. Chinese are very proud of their long history lasting for thousands years. As one of four great ancient civilizations, Chinese civilization is the only one which has been continued to this day. Obviously, before the century of humiliation, ancient China had made a great deal of achievements. The Four Great Inventions (papermaking, gunpowder, printing technique and compass) are the strong evidences of material developments in ancient China. In foreign relations, China had been the strongest power in East Asia and exported its goods and expanded its influence by the Silk Road. But the soft rather than hard power is the core of ancient Chinese civilization, and Confucianism may be the greatest product offered by China for other countries. Since Confucianism was created by Confucius and adopted by the Chinese emperor in Han dynasty, it had guided the politic system, social interaction and spiritual life of intellectuals for almost two thousand years in ancient China. Internationally, Confucianism had the great temptation to China's neighbors. Many East Asian countries became voluntarily the member of tribute system led by China even at the cost of being vassal states. Why? Besides for the profitable trade with China, one of the motives is to import China's Confucianism and even Chinese writing system to improve their level of governance.

The double memories about the ancient glory and the modern humiliation have shaped the goals of the contemporary China's foreign strategy. In the eyes of the external watchers, the strategic goal of a socialist country is to rise (崛起, jué qǐ). But for China which achieved the great civilization and suffered the humiliation century, the total agenda of current strategy is *national revival* (民族复兴, mín zú fù xīng). The slogan of *Revitalize the Chinese nation* (振兴中华, zhèn xīng zhōng huá) was firstly suggested by a famous revolutionist, Sun Yat-sen, in 1894, then inherited by Chairman Mao and other communist leaders. Because the Chinese communists have considered they are the successor of Sun's great cause, although Sun was the founder of the nationalist (Guomindang) government, he has been praised highly as the *great revolutionary forerunner* (伟大的革命先行者, wěi dà de gé mìng xiān xíng zhě) and respected as father of the nation by PRC established by Chairman Mao.

As the strategic goal of foreign policies, national revival has the different meaning from rise. Rise means usually the increase of national power, but national revival for China has three levels of objectives. (1) *Security*. Because China suffered the humiliated invasions and bullies from the western powers in the modern history, national security is considered as the precondition of national revival. This belief has been further solidified by the isolation during the Cold War and the current confrontation with the United States. At present, the Chinese government lists a variety of security concerns, but territorial and regime security is the most important goal. (2) *Power*. For China, power means the international status, prestige as the world or regional power and national strength to protect itself rather than the control over other countries. Even ever as a dominant power in the tribute system, China did seldom conquer and annex its neighbors. In a word, for China, power means usually two things: the symbol of strong country and the guarantee of national revival. (3) *Civilization*. Civilization as a goal means that China wants to revive or recreate its development model and spread its influence by values, ideas and thoughts, not just by military. This is the highest and last objective of national revival. Confucianism was the center of old Chinese civilization, but it could not be applied directly to the modern society. Could socialism offer a new civilization for China? What relations between socialism and Confucianism should be? No clear answer is made so far.



INFLUENCE OF CULTURE FACTOR

Neo-realism believes that every unit would take the same or similar policies under the international anarchy. This argument may be right to some extent when it only describe generally the nature and direction of foreign policies for state actors. But if focus on the specific foreign behavior and interaction of different types of countries, you would find the more diverse and complicated conclusions. For example, facing the challenges brought by the globalization, power rival, regional identity and illegal immigrants, the United Kingdom chose to leave Europe Union (EU) while French and German were trying to coordinate the EU. Different behaviors are the result of different nation, ethnicity, culture and leaders. Here, the role of culture would be investigated in the foreign decision-making of China.

Alastair Iain Johnson believes that there are two different strategic cultures: one is idealized Confucian-Mencian paradigm (idealpolitik); the other is realized parbellum paradigm (realpolitik). He addresses that the latter is actually a dominant one.³ Similarly, ancient Chinese politicians and elites had summarized two paradigms, Wangdao (王道, wáng dào) and Badao (霸道, bà dào), as the fundamental approaches to govern the country and deal with the external world. Badao addresses the importance of power and even armed force. It is similar with realism in international relations theories. Qin shi huang, the first emperor of Qin dynasty, was the famous representative of this paradigm. Wangdao means to treat others by the peaceful approaches and advocates developing and using the moral strength. This paradigm is similar with liberalism and idealism in international relations theories. Confucius was the pioneer of this paradigm in Chinese traditional thinkers.

In the long history of Chinese domestic and foreign politics, two paradigms have been competed each other and are usually mutual alternative. But, Wangdao has the moral superiority over Badao. Wangdao has been praised highly and Baodao criticized in the mainstream of political thoughts. It is difficult to judge which paradigm had been practiced more in reality, but at least in foreign domain it is reasonable to believe that Wangdao was a dominant approach. For example, during the tribute system, although there were some mutual conflicts and wars between China and its neighbors and in

³ Alastair Iain Johnson, *Culture realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

some cases China took the initial attack to the enemies or the trouble-maker to the tribute system, China consolidated its dominant position mainly by the influence originated from its wealth, rituals and Confucianism in the most period. Besides the moral idealism, the pragmatism also contributed to the dominant position of Wangdao paradigm. With few exceptions, most Chinese emperors believe that it was the easier and more economical approach to solve the troubles caused by the so-called barbarians outside the country by the peaceful means and even appeasing them. Johnston's argument is wonderful but induced only from the study of Ming dynasty and can't summarize rightfully the nature of Chinese strategic culture. Even in Ming dynasty, some counterexamples to his arguments could be found. For example, Mingtaizu, the first emperor of Ming, listed 15 countries which should not be conquered by China in his testament (《皇明祖训》, *huáng míng zǔ xùn*) to his heirs because it was unworthy for China to have their lands and resources by the military. Just in Ming dynasty, the famous General Zhen He conducted seven peaceful voyages down the Western Sea for showing prestige and boosting trade, rather than occupying territories. When some high officials attacked these voyages as wasteful and futile, the emperor ordered to stop them.

The history shows that China was naturally never an expansionist power. The worship of Wangdao is rooted in Confucianism. The dominant position of Confucianism in the long history originated from the fact that China has been a huge self-sufficient society with less foreign influence and less need to intervene the external world. Because East Asia had been in a relatively closed geographical region for thousands of years, China and its vassal states maintained a long, steady and even stagnant self-sufficient domestic society and international tribute system before the invasion of Opium war. Chinese traditional strategic culture with the worship of Wangdao is thus rooted very deeply. Today, China has participated into a global community and its perspectives and conceptions about the world have changed a lot, but its fundamental values and logic is still remained. This is because of not only the strong tradition, but also a fact that China is still a huge self-sufficient society compared with the most powers. Moreover, globalization has given China more opportunities to attain the wealth and influence by its open-up policy rather than military. Thus, there are today less reasons to follow another dangerous approach, Baodao.

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICIES FROM 1949 TO 2012

In 1949, China became a socialist country led by Communist Party of China (CPC) and allied with another socialist power, the Soviet Union. In the long period, the Cold War had been the dominant perspective to understand Chinese foreign policies. Soon after the end of the Cold War, power competition has become the new paradigm to analyze China's relations with the United States. But, although the factors of ideology and power competition had really been in the comprehensive calculation of Chinese leaders, the tradition of history and culture has still defined fundamentally the foreign strategies of the socialist China. In the eve of the founding of new China, Chairman Mao declared in a speech that "our nation will be no longer humiliated again, we have stood upwe will appear again in the world as a nation with the highly development culture".⁴ Since then, national revival has been the grand strategy of socialist China. But, during the different periods, the policy meaning of national revival is more or less different. Although the total goal of national revival has been continued, the three levels of this strategy, security, power and civilization, are always given the different specific meaning

⁴ 《毛泽东文集》第5卷，人民出版社1996年版，第344~345页。

by the different leaders.

What factors have contributed to the differences? There are three variables which should be investigated. (1) *Personal factors*. Any political decision is made by certain persons in either socialist countries or Western-democracy, and thus the different character, preferences, family background and education experiences of leaders may lead to different decisions. (2) *National power*. There is a Chinese idiom: doing business according to your capability (量力而行, liàng lì ér xíng). From 1949 to 2012, Chinese national power has improved greatly. The Chinese leaders at the different stages of development can only make decisions according to the national strength at that time. (3) *International environment*. Every power exists in the certain international environment and their behaviors have to be limited to the surrounding. But, this limitation varies with national strength. Usually, big powers enjoy more freedom and smaller powers suffer more restraints.

To generalize, the total goal of Chinese foreign policies, national revival, are mainly decided based on its historical memories of great civilization vs. humiliation century, and the specific goals and policy behaviors, tools and approaches are mainly shaped by the contemporary factors such as persona factors, national power and international environment. This logic could be demonstrated by the continuities and changes in the foreign policies of different Chinese leaders.

MAO'S ERA (1949-1976)

In Mao's China, there were two priorities in the goals of foreign policies. The first is the security of socialist regime. People's Republic of China was founded on October 1, 1949 after the Chinese communists defeated their long-term rival, Nationalist Party of China (NPC). But, NPC still controlled Taiwan by the support of the US and had plotted of counter-attacking the mainland. When consolidating the regime as the highest priority, as the winner of socialist revolution in a big Asian country, the second goal of then CPC was suggested and even ever supported by the Soviet Union. This goal is to play the leading role of the world revolution together with the Soviet Union. For Chairman Mao, the title of world revolution meant not only the growth of Chinese power, but also the appearance of new Chinese civilization with the great allure of value, idea and development model. Unfortunately, as the big brother of Socialist camp, the real plan of the Soviet Union is to let China share its burden in the world revolution rather than compete with itself on the leadership of international communist movement. Consequently a big quarrel and then alienation happened between two socialist powers.

To achieve its goals, Chairman Mao's China had taken 3A policies from 1949 to 1976.

Arm: to use arm against any power threatening China's security. The US had not recognized the legitimacy of socialist China and considered the NPC government in Taiwan as the only representative of China before 1972 and posed the total blockade and sanctions against China. Thus, Mao and his colleagues decided to send Chinese troops and military aids into Korean Peninsula in 1950s and Vietnam in 1960s and 1970s to help its socialist neighbors to resist the American invasions. But, the US was not the only enemy China armed against. To safeguard its border security, China had no hesitation to use the military against India in 1962 and the Soviet Union in 1969.

Argument: to argue with the Soviet Union about the issues of guidelines and leadership of international communist movement. After a few years of honeymoon, the heated controversies erupted between two big socialist powers. Chinese newspapers criticized the Soviet Union very sharply and finally considered it as the revisionist power in socialist movements. In some years, the revisionist USSR rather than the imperialist US had been considered as the No.1 enemy by the socialist China.

Aid: to offer a great deal of economic and military aids to the development world and socialist countries. These aids focused mainly on Asia, Africa and even some socialist countries in East Europe. In North Korea and Vietnam, China's support helped them defeat the American invasions. In some African countries, the Chinese aids were used to compete the influence with the US and Soviet Union. In the socialist countries such as Albania, China hoped its generosity could help it consolidate its position and power in socialist movement.

Comparatively, the frequency of war and military conflicts with other countries during the Mao's China is more than any other period since 1949. Obviously, the personal experiences of Chairman Mao and their colleagues is an important factor. They had a belief of "power grows out of the barrel of a gun" (枪杆子里出政权, qiāng gǎn zi li chū zhèng quán) and had learned how to defeat the enemy by the military in the civil war. In addition, the idealistic personality and passionate character of Chairman Mao may be one of impetuses pushed him to confront the rivals and pursue the world leadership. The international environment also contributed to China's choice at that time. In the Cold War full of confrontation and security anxiety, the final choice might be more likely fighting rather compromise. Aiding was a smart alternative some time. The poverty of China at that time seems to contradict with Chairman Mao's generosity in offering aid. But, if realized that the aid to the strategic countries such as the North Korea and Vietnam helped China stop the direct attack from the US, this investment really paid off.

DENG'S ERA (1978-1992)

Be different from the Chairman Mao's China, Deng Xiaoping had considered economic development as his core cause when he ruled China as the de facto leader from 1978 to 1992. During the Mao's era, China believed that the third world war was inevitable so that the main goal of its foreign policies was to prepare for the big war. But, Deng changed this judgment and made the conclusion that the theme of time had shifted from war and revolution to peace and development, and thus the world war could be avoided. Based on the assessment, Deng decided to end the Chinese isolation from the world, launched the reform and open-up policy, and improved the relations with the Western developed countries. In a short period, Deng once had to focus on the regime security when the Western powers posed the sanctions against China after the Tian'anmen event in 1989. Even in that case, he still insisted the economic development and pushed the then China towards the path of socialist market economy.

When peace and development rather than war and revolution dominated the foreign agenda, Chinese foreign approaches were changed accordingly. Specifically, Deng's foreign policies can be summed up in the following three key words:

Integration: to integrate into the world economy led by the Western powers. Long before the end of the Cold War, Deng realized the isolation and the communist camp led by the Soviet Union could not help China develop economy. The real target of his open-up policy is to open the door to the West. He was eager for the investment, technology and management experiences from the West and since then pushed China participate such international organizations led by the US as World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and struggled for the membership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Co-existence: seek to the compromise with its traditional rivals. In the late period of Mao's rule, China normalized its relations with the US in order to confront the Soviet Union. But, Deng's policy was to keep the friendly relation with the two powers at the same time. After years of negotiation, China

normalized finally its relations with the Soviet Union. China no longer exported the idea of world revolution and stopped its support to the rebellions in some neighbors. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence suggested together with India and Burma in 1954 was polished again and used in Chinese relations with not only socialist but also non-socialist countries.

Low intensity confrontation: to counter quickly and limitedly the threat if necessary. Deng was one of leader circle supersized by Chairman Mao and sensitive to the history of humiliation century and the security issue like Mao. Thus, although his priority was to develop the economy, he took the strong responses when the attack from the outside was unbearable. A typical example was the border war with Vietnam in 1979. When Vietnam which received the Chinese aids in the long time betrayed China, allied with Chinese enemy, the Soviet Union, invaded Chinese ally, Cambodia, persecuted the Chinese Vietnamese and harassed the border, Deng decided to punish this former ally by launching a quick military attack. The main battle was ended in one month and China withdrew all of its troops from the Vietnamese territory.

Compared with Chairman Mao, Deng insisted the low profile in international stage. Especially after the Tian'anmen event, he set the principle of *keeping a low profile and doing something necessary* (韬光养晦, 有所作为; tāo guāng yǎng huì, yǒu suǒ zuò wéi) which has guided Chinese foreign policies since then. One of the factors which made him be silent in international stage may be his pragmatism. He was not good at and didn't like talking the abstract conception and theory like a philosopher. On the contrary, his policies were always focusing on the concrete goals. His logic is that poverty is not socialism and thus economic development should dominate the domestic and foreign agenda. Of course, the weak national power was one of limitations for China's international role at that time. Deng reduced largely the foreign aids for decreasing economic burden. International environment at that time was helpful to Deng's policies. Especially, the US welcomed the Chinese economic integration into the world system led by it and pursued generally the friendly policies to China in 1980s.

JIANG AND HU'S ERA (1992-2012)

President Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are respectively defined as the cores of 3rd and 4th generation leadership of CPC, but they shared the similar foreign strategies and international challenges and thus are here considered as in the same stage of evolution of Chinese foreign policies. They followed the Deng's policies on open-up, economic development and the principle of *keeping a low profile and doing something necessary*, but faced some different challenges that Deng less faced. Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, China began to suffer the strategic pressure directly from the US and the geopolitical situation had changed greatly. In one hand, the economic concern was still the highest priority to conduct China's foreign behaviors. In the other hand, President Jiang and Hu had to pay more attention in playing a more positive role in the international stage when the discussion about China's rise appeared more and more at home and abroad. To achieve these contradictory goals, President Jiang and Hu developed gradually the following policies:

Cooperation: to develop the all-round cooperative relations with all countries. Four fields and their goals in foreign domain had set gradually in this period: to maintain the steady relations with major powers, to push the good-neighborhood policy with the neighboring countries, to strengthen the solidarity with the developing countries, and to play a constructive role in the multilateral stages. All the efforts in these domains were made for achieving a peaceful and stable international environment which is the key for Chinese economic development. The slogans of democratization of international

relations under President Jiang and harmonious world under President Hu can be considered the efforts that China committed to develop the friendship with every actor in international stage.

Concert of powers: to balance the relations among major powers. Although developing countries were given the same status in the foreign principals, but China realized major powers were the real keys to manage its foreign affairs. To balance the increasing pressures from the US, President Jiang and Hu had committed more and more to develop the strategic relations with Russia. European powers (especially German, France and the UK), Japan and India usually shared the same value with the US, but China still considered them as the potential partners and develop the friendship with them as much as possible.

Soft confrontation: to fight against its rivals mainly by the diplomatic and moral fighting. In the process of pursuing peace, China still faced some serious challenges sometime. In 1997, the missiles from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) warplanes bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia. In 2001, a Chinese military aircraft collided with an American spy plane over the South China Sea. In these crises, the domestic nationalist pressures pushed the Chinese government to react strongly. But the then leaders limited wisely the scale and extent of their reaction and stopped a dangerous idea to conduct any military counterattack.

These approaches during the President Jiang and Hu's era were shaped by the three factors too. In the level of personal factors, although the characteristics and styles of President Jiang and Hu were obviously different, both of them could be recognized as pragmatist and didn't sacrifice Chinese economy to against the US. In the level of national power, although Chinese economy had increased rapidly under their rules and became the No.2 biggest economy in the world in 2010, Chinese leaders found it was more difficult to confront the US because its economy were integrated deeply into the world economy led by the US. The level of international environment gave China some spaces to manoeuvre because of the multi-polarization in which although Russia was weaker partner for China than its predecessor, the Soviet Union, other Western powers could be the potential hands to balance the US. For example, in 2003, when the US launched the Iraq war, its allies such France, Germany stood up with Russia and China to against this war.

CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES UNDER XI JINPING

Some China watchers believe that President Xi Jinping changed greatly the Chinese diplomacy and China has been more ambitious and assertive since he took office. This argument overlooks the continuities and exaggerates the changes between President Xi and his predecessors. Like the previous Chinese leaders, President Xi has made some changes while kept a few continuities in his foreign domain. Continuities and changes should be given the same attention. For the analysts, the real questions should be: what continuities and changes have been made? What factors has influenced the continuities and changes? Why has the changes rather than continuities attracted more attention?

The image of Xi's assertiveness is mainly drawn by the Western analysts according to his policies on the Diaoyu islands and South China Sea. When Japan "nationalize" the Diaoyu islands in 2012 and the Philippines broke the consensus on political settlement and submitted an arbitration to the international court to illegalize the nine-dash line in 2013, China responded strongly by sending the patrol ships to the Diaoyu islands and began a large scale construction on the islands and reefs in the

South China Sea. But, these behaviors are only the small part of President Xi's package of foreign policies. When he defended Chinese sovereignty by his firm hands, he suggested many inclusive and friendly policies to other countries too. For example, he announced guideline of ASEAN policy is "amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness" (亲诚惠容, qīn chéng huì róng) and he appealed to ASEAN to build the community of shared destiny when he visited Indonesia in 2013. In Africa, President Xi proposed the new conception of justice and interests which addressed the importance of justice over interests. Based on these conceptions and values, the Belt and Road Initiative was suggested as a grand strategy by President Xi Jinping in 2013. Since then, China has invested a great deal of money and diplomatic resources. In May 2013, Chinese premier Li Keqiang suggested the plan of the Sino-Pakistan Economic Corridor which investment is over 46 billion dollars. In May 2014, China and Kenya signed the railway agreement which investment is over 25 billion dollars. In November 2014, Xi declared that Chinese government will contribute 40 billion dollars to set the Silk-road Foundation. Although some criticisms insist that China is trying to buy the hearts of other countries by money and BRI is serving China's foreign strategy, a simple fact is that China is dealing with the world by using investment, trade and aid rather than military. An interesting comparison between China the US may be noted. The American presidents are declared as the leader of democratic world, but they are always busy with plotting and launching wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria. President Xi may be considered a tough leader from the Western perspective, but he is hugging the world softly and peacefully. Which will benefit the world more?

Thus, it is necessary to have a more comprehensive perspective to summarize Xi's foreign policies. By this perspective, both continuities and changes could be found when compare President Xi's diplomacy with his predecessors. To sum up, there are more continuities in his strategic goal and more changes in his policy tools. Only by combining these two sides, it will be possible to achieve a better understanding about President Xi's diplomacy.

XI JINPING'S GOALS

In 2012, when President Xi Jinping visited "The Road toward Revival" exhibition along with other members of the Standing Committee of Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, he delivered a speech in which he declared that China is approaching its goal of great revival closer than ever and is more confident and capable of achieving the goal than ever. In Xi's political discourse, the total goal of CPC is to achieve the Chinese dream which core is to achieve the national revival. The double memory of great civilization and humiliation century was shaped and strengthened repeatedly in the process of Chinese interaction with the eternal world. Thus, the national revival is a more direct and meaningful guideline to Chinese foreign affairs than its domestic domain.

Compared with the continuities in the strategic goal under President Xi's rule, more changes appear in the three specific goals of security, power and civilization.

Security. The current China is No.2 biggest economy with nuclear weapons and increasing military budgets. It is unlikely to suffer the foreign invasion again like what happened in the late Qing dynasty. But, the current China still has two concerns in security. One is regime security. As a socialist country, the peaceful evolution has been a real threat since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the explosion of Color Revolution in some Central Asian and East European countries. Especially when the strategic competition between China and the US is tightened, China believes the peaceful evolution will be used as one of policy tools by his competitor. The second security concern is the increasing tension in its territory disputes with Japan, India, the Philippines, Vietnam etc. Besides the confrontation in Diaoyu

islands and South China Sea, Chinese military were ever in a few stalemates with its Indian counterpart in recent years. As the government calls on people by the slogan of national revival, it is impossible for China to permit the new loss in its territory. But at the same time, China does not want to sacrifice the peaceful international environment which is the key to its economic development. President Xi has to keep the cautious balance between these contradictory pressures like his predecessors.

Power. With the increasing national power, China under President Xi's rule is obviously willing to play a bigger role in international stage. President Jiang and Hu basically abided by Deng's instruction that China should not take the lead. This instruction was suggested in a special period in which China was isolated by the West because of the Tian'anmen event. When the second decade of 21st century has come, this instruction is obviously no longer compatible with present needs of either China or the world. However, the Chinese pursuing for the international leadership is still moderate and even hesitantly. China iterated repeatedly that it doesn't want to challenge the American hegemon. In fact, President Xi suggested repeatedly developing the new type relations with the US which based on the principals of non-conflict and non-confrontation. But this propose did not get the positive response. Some people may believe the founding of Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is the strong evidence that China is searching for its financial leadership. The fact is that the preferred plan for China at that time is to increase its shareholder in World Bank and International Monetary Fund led by the US, but the US refused to give China more voice. Moreover, World Bank and Asia Development Bank led by Japan could not satisfy the need of investment in the developing world. In this situation, China turned to the idea of establishing AIIB.

Civilization. Compared with Deng, Jiang and Hu, a prominent change in President Xi's strategic goals is that his focuses are not only on security and power but also the future of Chinese development model or path. In this regard, President Xi shares the similar concern with Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao once believed that China should be the center of world revolution and Maoist socialism should be followed by other countries. The difference is that President Xi has no plan to expand Chinese socialism in other countries. After the policy of no revolution export suggested by Deng, to respect each country's choice of development path according to its own national conditions has become one of Chinese foreign doctrines. For President Xi, all countries may learn each other and thus he does not refuse other countries to learn something from the Chinese model. For example, *Xi Jinping: The Governance of China*, one book reflecting his policy thoughts, has been published in multiple languages in recent years. For the current Chinese leaders, what they are willing to publicize and spread is Chinese governing approaches rather than political ideology. In fact, they realize seriously and even recognize gladly that Chinese socialism as a China's advantage can't be copied by other countries. In a word, President Xi has showed more interests and signs to renew China as a new civilization not just a country or power, but the Chinese plans for this goal are still moderate and are limited in the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

XI JINPING'S APPROACHES

Be different from President Jiang and Hu, Xi pursues the strategy of national revival by some more ambitious approaches. Thus, it could be found that there are more changes in his policy tools and he discards to some extent the policy style of low-profile insisted by President Jiang and Hu. Specifically speaking, these changes under President Xi's rule are the following:

Proactive policies. During the period of low-profile policy, the most behaviors of China were the passive reaction to the external stimulus and China rarely took the initiative to shape the outside world. But,

President Xi decided to make some differences. The most prominent example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) suggested by him in 2013. By this policy, China has proposed actively the offers on infrastructure cooperation, investment, trade, finance and people-to-people exchanges to the developing countries in Asia, Africa and East Europe. The critics in the West believe that BRI is a geopolitical game which aims at ending the Western hegemon. This argument is obviously oversimplified Chinese intention and plans. BRI is not just an economic plan, but it is not a road-map to confront the US too. What President Xi wants to do is to revive the ancient Silk Road. According to Chinese understanding, the Silk Road is not only the outcome of great ancient Chinese civilization, but also the symbol of co-existence, prosperity and friendship among different countries. In Chinese eyes, BRI, the contemporary Silk Road, is a win-win game.

Strong response if necessary. Although showing usually the posture of more goodwill, China could take some tougher reactions if necessary. As the watchers noticed, after the Philippines refused the proposals of bilateral negotiation offered repeatedly by China and filed the suit to the international court, China started the massive constructions on the islands and reefs controlled by itself. From the Chinese perspective, its previous policies of too restraint not only made China suffer the big losses, but encouraged the provocations from other claimants. In fact, the South China Sea policy had been the target of folk criticism in China before President Xi and the tougher reaction by President Xi has achieved a great applaud from the domestic public opinion. But, the toughness is not always the feature of President Xi's foreign policies. When there was a confrontation happened on the Chinese-Indian border in 2017, Xi decided to find a compromise with Indian Prime Minister Mody. Finally, he achieved that goal by a bilateral summit in Wuhan.

More effective enforcement. Foreign relations should be a highly centralized field. But, in a long period, in China there had been not a strong regime to coordinate the different concerned parties: foreign ministry, commerce ministry, military and international Liaison Department of CPC which is the key role in dealing with the socialist countries such as Democratic People Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Vietnam. Chairman Mao and Deng as the traditional strong leaders could guide these units to work together by their personal authority, but the bureaucracy politics during the President Jiang and Hu periods undermined the cooperation among these actors. In the late 1990s, China ever tried to copy the American model to establish National Security Commission and failed. Under the rule of President Xi, the fragmented foreign policies are not tolerated and a strong institution led by him, National Security Commission of CPC, was established in 2013. Under the new mechanism, China now could take a more rapid and effective response to the external challenges.

FACTORS SHAPING XI'S DIPLOMACY

Many analysts believe that Xi's personality makes his policies different. The role of personal factors is truly so prominent but should not be exaggerated. The combination of three levels in personal, national and international has shaped President Xi's diplomacy.

Personal factors. Many believe that President Xi has a very strong personality which is so different from President Jiang and Hu. Compared with his predecessors, President Xi's family background may contribute to his more confidence. He is one of the second generation of revolutionary (红二代, hong'er-dai) and his father Xi Zhongxun was one of senior leaders of CPC and played an important role in Chinese politics in 1980s as the colleague of Deng Xiaoping. As the most powerful Chinese leader since the death of Chairman Mao, it is naturally for Xi to show the more confidence in his foreign policies.

National power. The growing national strength gives the current Chinese leader more capacity to practice the proactive policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative. When China becomes the No.2 biggest economy in 2010, its GDP was \$6.10 trillion which was equivalent to the 40% of American GDP. In 2018, Chinese GDP grew to \$13.6 trillion, nearly two-thirds of American GDP. Of Course, the per capita GDP in China is still much lower (more than 9000 dollars in 2018) compared with the US and other Western powers. The Chinese economic growth rate is still relatively high, but it is harder and even impossible to maintain the speed as high as before in the future. The result of this double faces of Chinese economy is that the increasing strength has supported China's increasing roles in world affairs, but the relative low level of development and domestic challenges will limit its further objectives.

International environment. The international environment since 2013 has posed the double challenges to China. In one side, because of the increasing power and international status, the US has considered China as its strategic competitor and decided to take all kinds of measures to contain China's rise. Whether the Asia-Pacific rebalancing of President Obama or the Indo-Pacific strategy of President Trump, the only real goal for the US is to delay the steps of China's rise and decrease the influence of China in the world especially in the Asia-Pacific. Under the stricter pressures from the sole hegemon and its allies, China's operational space in international stage has been greatly compressed. Besides that, China's diplomacy has been harassed deeply by the territorial disputes and some regional hotspots such as Korean nuclear issue and terrorism in South Asia. Some analysts even begin to discuss if the window of strategic opportunity for China has disappeared. But in the other side, the chaos, ineffectiveness, hypocrisy and disunity of Western world in dealing with the 2008 financial crisis, refugee issue and Syrian civil war has been witnessed by the whole world in the last decade, Chinese model has thus been recognized and appreciated by more countries.

To generalize, in viewing the President Xi's foreign policies, it could be argued that there is more continuity on the level of strategic goal and more changes on policy tools. Obviously, it is strategic goal rather policy tools to shape the main face of China's diplomacy and thus President Xi's diplomacy is still the continuation of socialist Chinese diplomacy based on the traditional and contemporary factors. Looking forward to the future, it is very likely that China will continue to play the role of a powerful but peaceful long (龙, lóng) rather than horrible and evil dragon in international stage. Following the Confucian tradition, President Xi wants to achieve the world prestige by Wangdao rather than Baodao. Thus, he decided to choose the soft approaches such as the BRI in dealing with the world. The only uncertainty may be from the strategic competition imposed by the US. The competition based on the rule and by the peaceful approaches should be welcomed by both parties. To fight against the US is not in the interests of China because of the big risks, but it may be the US rather than China to refuse to compete by rule. Top Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, continued to advocate for a 'new type of major power relations' with the United States.⁵ But, the response from President Trump is the unlimited trade war which destroyed the WTO rules and undermined China's confidence in the peaceful rise and competition. If the Sino-American competition could not be managed properly in the future, China will try to keep its policy goal in the path of peaceful rise, but its policy tools may be forced to change more or less.

⁵ Jack A. Smith, "The Hegemony Games: USA vs. PRC", Jun 1, 2015, <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2015/06/01/the-hegemony-games-usa-vs-prc/>.